Abstract. In this paper, we present a heuristic algorithm that computes the ideal class group and a generator of a principal ideal (PIP) in Q(ζps ) in time 2 O(n 1/2+ε ) for n := deg(Q(ζps )) and arbitrarily small ε > 0. We introduce practical improvements to enhance its run time, and we describe a variant that can compute a generator of a principal ideal I with N (I) ≤ 2 n b in time 2 . In particular, this precomputation allows us to solve these instances of the PIP in with a run time lower than 2 O(n 1/2 ) .
1/2+ε ) for n := deg(Q(ζps )) and arbitrarily small ε > 0. We introduce practical improvements to enhance its run time, and we describe a variant that can compute a generator of a principal ideal I with N (I) ≤ 2 n b in time 2 . In particular, this precomputation allows us to solve these instances of the PIP in with a run time lower than 2 O(n 1/2 ) .
Relying on recent work from Cramer et al. [CDPR16] , this yields an attack on all the cryptographic schemes relying on the hardness of finding a short generator of a principal ideal of Q(ζps ) such as the homomorphic encryption scheme of Vercauteren and Smart [SV10] , and the multilinear maps of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13] . This attack (with and without precomputation) is asymptotically faster than the one relying on the work of Biasse and Fieker [Biab, BF14] which runs in time 2 O(n 2/3+ε ) for arbitrarily small ε > 0.
Moreover, combined with the recent heuristic reduction of γ-SVP to the PIP under reasonable assumptions on the class group of Cramer, Ducas and Wesolowski [CDW16] , our algorithm solves γ-SVP in Q(ζps ) for γ ∈ eÕ 
Introduction
Given an ideal a of the maximal order O K of K = Q(ζ 2 s ), we want to decide if a is principal, and if so, compute α ∈ O K such that a = (α)O K . This corresponds to the Principal Ideal Problem (PIP), which is a fundamental problem in computational number theory. The resolution of the PIP in classes of number fields of large degree recently received a growing attention due to its connection with cryptosystems based on the hardness of finding short generators of principal ideals such as the homomorphic encryption scheme of Vercauteren and Smart [SV10] , and the multilinear maps of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13] .
A generator of a principal ideal of the maximal order O K of K = Q(ζ p s ) can be found in heuristic subexponential time L ∆ (2/3 + ε, c) for some c > 0 where L ∆ (a, b) = e (b+o(1))(ln |∆|) a (ln ln |∆)
by using an algorithm of Biasse and Fieker [Biab, BF14] . We can also find one in quantum polynomial time with an algorithm of Biasse and Song [BS16] which relies on the hidden subgroup resolution algorithm for R O(n) of Eisenträger, Hallgren, Kitaev and Song [EHKS14] . To go from an arbitrary generator α to a small one, we need to multiply α by the right unit. This is an instance of the Bounded Distance Decoding problem in the lattice of the logarithms of the complex embeddings of the elements of K. Campbel, Groves and Shepherd [CGS] observed that using an LLL reduction of the basis of this lattice consisting of the so-called cyclotomic units [Was82, Chap. 8] and performing a simple round-off reduction yielded the solution to the problem. This fact was corroborated by Schank in a replication study [Sch] . Shortly thereafter, Cramer, Ducas, Peikert and Regev [CDPR16] proved that this fact was due to the intrinsic geometric properties of the cyclotomic units and that the LLL reduction was not necessary. The draft of Campbel et al. also contained elements on ongoing work on a quantum algorithm for solving the PIP which was interrupted when they conjectured that the methods of Eisenträger et al. [EHKS14] would ultimately yield a quantum polynomial time algorithm for solving the PIP.
These recent developments raised the question of the hardness of the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) in ideal lattices (and principal ideal lattices in particular). According to Cramer et al. [CDPR16, Sec. 6 ], a short generator of a principal ideal in a cyclotomic ring is at least within a factor eÕ ( √ n) of a shortest element.
To the best of our knowledge, there is currently no method that can leverage the knowledge of a short generator to derive an element with length within a better approximation factor to the first minima. However, a short generator of a principal ideal is also a solution to γ-SVP for γ ∈ eÕ ( √ n) . In addition, Cramer, Ducas and Wesolowski [CDW16] showed that given an ideal I in a cyclotomic ring and under reasonable assumptions on the ideal class group, there is a heuristic method relying on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in Cl(O K ) to find an ideal J ⊆ O K with N (J) ∈ e O(n 3/2 ) such that IJ is principal. Then a short generator of the principal ideal IJ ⊆ I yields a solution to γ-SVP in I for γ ∈ eÕ ( √ n) .
Contributions We describe an attack running in heuristic complexity 2 O(n 1/2+ε ) for arbitrarily small ε > 0 against cryptographic schemes relying on the hardness of finding a short generator of an ideal in Q(ζ p s ), including the homomorphic encryption scheme of Smart and Vercauteren [SV10] , and the multilinear maps of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13] . We rely on a different ideal class group computation and PIP algorithms than the subsexponential methods of Biasse and Fieker [BF14] which run in time 2 O(n 2/3+ε ) for arbitrarily small ε > 0. We take advantage of the small height of the defining polynomial of fields of the form Q(ζ p s ), and we use a modified q-descent method to solve the PIP.
We also describe practical improvements to our algorithm for computing the ideal class group and solving the PIP that do not improve the theoretical complexity, but that have a significant impact on the performances of our methods.
Finally, we present a PIP resolution method that leverages a precomputation on Q(ζ p s ) of a higher cost than 2 O(n 1/2+ε ) . Using this precomputation, we achieve a better heuristic complexity than 2 O(n 1/2 ) when solving all subsequent PIP instances for which N (I) ≤ 2 Combined with the recent heuristic reduction from γ-SVP to the short PIP of Cramer et al. [CDW16] (under the same assumptions on the class group), this yields a heuristic algorithm for γ-SVP in ideals I of Q(ζ p s ) satisfying N (I) ≤ 2 n b with precomputation on Q(ζ p s ) for γ ∈ eÕ ( √ n) with a better trade-off approximation/cost than BKZ. For example:
-With a precomputation of cost 2
-Given a 2 O(n 5/7+ε ) precomputation, the private keys of the multilinear maps of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13] can be retrieved in time 2
from the corresponding public keys.
Background
Lattices A lattice is a discrete additive subgroup of R n for some integer n. The first minima of a lattice L is defined by
k×n is the matrix of a basis of L. For a full dimensional lattice L, the best upper bound we know on
The problem of finding a shortest vector v ∈ L is known as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), while the problem of finding v ∈ L such that v ≤ γλ 1 (L) for some γ ≥ 1 is known has γ-SVP. A solution 
O(n) in polynomial time in n and log(|A|). The BKZ algorithm [AKS01] with block size k returns a basis
Poly(n, log(|A|). Finally, the HKZ algorithm returns a basis
The problem of finding n linearly inde-
is the Shortest Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP), and √ nγ-SVIP efficiently reduces to γ-SVP.
Number fields A number field K is a finite extension of Q. Its ring of integers O K has the structure of a Z-lattice of degree n = [K : Q], and the orders O ⊆ O K are the sublattices of O K which have degree n and which are equipped with a ring structure. A number field has r 1 ≤ n real embeddings (σ i ) i≤r1 and 2r 2 complex embeddings (σ i ) r1<i≤2r2 (coming as r 2 pairs of conjugates). The field K is isomorphic to O K ⊗ Q where O K denotes the ring of integers of K.
, and let x := T 2 (x, x) be the corresponding L 2 -norm. The norm of an element
The volume of the fundamental domain is |∆|, and the size of the input of algorithms working on an integral basis of O K is in O(log(|∆|)). In K = Q(ζ p s ), the degree satisfies
, therefore log(|∆|) ∼ n log(n) and we can express the complexity of our algorithms in terms of n (a choice we made in this paper), which makes it easier to compare with other lattice reduction result. However, most of the literature on class group computation presents complexities in terms of log(|∆|), which is in general the right value to measure the input. For example, it makes no sense to express the complexity with respect to the degree of K in infinite classes of quadratic number number fields.
Cyclotomic fields A cyclotomic field is an extension of Q of the form K = Q(ζ N ) where ζ N = e 2iπ/N is a primitive N -th root of unity. The ring of integers
where Φ N is the N -th cyclotomic polynomial. When N is a power of two, Φ N (X) = X N/2 + 1, and when N = p s is a power of p > 2, we have Φ N (X) = X 
where the complex embeddings (σ i ) i≤n are ordered such that the first r = n/2 ones are not conjugates of each other. The volume R of L is an invariant of K called the regulator. The regulator R and the class number h satisfy hR [BPR04] ).
Notations Throughout this paper, A = max i,j |A i,j | denotes the infinite norm of a matrix. We denote by ln(x) the natural logarithm of x and by log(x) its base-2 logarithm.
High level description of the algorithm
In cryptosystems based on the hardness of finding a short generator of a principal ideal (in particular [SV10] and [GGH13] ), the secret key is a small generator g ∈ K = Q(ζ N ) of a principal ideal a ⊆ O K , and the public parameters include a Z-basis of a. We present a subexponential method for retrieving a generator of an input ideal that is asymptotically faster than the current state of the art [Biab, BF14] . Combined with the Bounded Distance Decoding method in
, this yield a better classical attack against the schemes relying the hardness of finding a short generator in a principal ideal. We also show how to leverage the precomputation of a large set of relations between generators of Cl(O K ) to solve the PIP in O K in time 2 O(n a ) for a < 1/2. Combined with the techniques of [CDW16] , this provides a method for solving γ-SVP in ideal lattices of K for γ ∈ eÕ (n 1/2 ) with a better trade-off approximation/cost than BKZ.
Solving the Principal Ideal Problem All subexponential time algorithms for solving the Principal Ideal Problem follow the same high level strategy. They derive from the subexponential algorithm for classes of fixed degree number fields [Buc90] , which itself is a generalization of the algorithm of Hafner and McCurley [HM89a] for quadratic number fields. Let B > 0 be a smoothness bound and B := {prime ideals p with N (p) ≤ B}. We first need to compute a generating set of the lattice Λ of all the vectors (e 1 , · · · , e m ) ∈ Z m such that
where m = |B|. When B > 12 ln 2 |∆|, the classes of ideals in B generate Cl(O K ) under the GRH [Bac90, Th. 4]. Therefore, (B, Λ) is a presentation of the group Cl(O K ) and the search for a generating set of the relations of the form (1) is equivalent to computing the group structure of Cl(O K ). Indeed, the morphism
is surjective, and the class group
If we only compute a generating set for a sublattice of Λ of finite index, then the cardinality of the tentative class group we obtain is a multiple of h = | Cl(O K )|. This can be tested by using an estimate of hR given by the methods of [Bac95] in polynomial time under the GRH. If we are missing relations to generate Λ, we obtain a multiple of hR, and this tells us we need to collect more relations. Let a be an input ideal. We find an extra relation of the form a = (α)p generating set for Cl(O K ), and the decomposition of the input ideal a with respect to this generating set. The computation of relations between generators of the ideal class group is independent of the specific instances of the PIP and can be precomputed. Moreover, the larger the smoothness bound B is, the faster the decomposition of an input ideal over B is. Naturally, this implies that the precomputation is more expensive since it requires the calculation of more relations.
Theorem 2. If we precompute all relations between ideals of norm less than B ∈ 2 O(n a ) for some 1/2 < a < 1, then the cost of solving the PIP is in Reducing the short-PIP and γ-SVP to the PIP Assume that the input ideal a ⊆ O K is generated by a short element g, and that we have computed
′ of a are of the form
The problem of finding g (or another short generator, which is equivalent for the sake of a cryptanalysis), boils down to finding (
is short. In the lattice of logarithm embeddings, this can be done by finding
To do this, we find the closest vector to Log(α) in the lattice L := Z Log(γ 1 ) + · · · + Z Log(γ r ).
The closest vector problem is a notoriously hard problem without prior knowledge on the properties of the lattice and the target vector. In our situation, things are made easier by the knowledge of the distribution of the target vector (given in the description of the cryptosystems [SV10, GGH13] ) and of a good basis for L. Indeed, the decryption algorithm of schemes relying on the hardness of the short-PIP works under the assumption that the generator g is small. This means that the target vector Log(α) is very close to the lattice L. Our instance of the Closest Vector Problem therefore turns into an instance of the Bounded Distance Decoding problem (BDD) since we have a bound on dist(Log(α), L). Moreover, we know a very good basis Log(γ i ) for L with which Babai's nearest plane algorithm [Bab85] returns the correct value.
Algorithm 2 short-PIP to PIP reduction
Input: A generator α ∈ OK of the ideal a ⊆ OK . Output: A short generator of a.
1: Let (γi) i≤r be the cyclotomic units of K.
A short generator of a principal ideal in K = Q(ζ p s ) yields a solution to γ-SVP for γ ∈ eÕ ( √ n) . Moreover, under reasonable assumptions on the ideal class group, given an arbitrary input ideal I ⊆ O K , the heuristic methods of [CDW16] allow us to find an ideal J with N (J) ∈ 2 O(n 3/2 ) such that IJ is principal. Then a short generator of IJ is a solution to γ-SVP for I with γ ∈ eÕ ( √ n) . The close principal multiple algorithm of [CDW16] uses the decomposition of an input ideal on a short generating set of the ideal class group. This can be done in quantum polynomial time using [BS16] , or in time 2
Theorem 4. If we precompute all relations between ideals of norm less than B ∈ 2 O(n a ) for some 1/2 < a < 1, then the cost of solving γ-SVP for γ ∈ eÕ
for arbitrarily small ε > 0 while the cost of the precomputation is in 2Õ 
Smoothness of ideals
Given B > 0, the expected time to find a relation of the form (α) = p where N (p i ) ≤ B depends on the probability that a random ideal a of bounded norm is B-smooth, that is to say of the form a = p 
ln(y) , ρ is the Dickman function, λ K is the residue of the zeta function ζ K (s) at s = 1 and (ln ln(x)) 5 3 +ε ≤ ln(y) ≤ ln(x), x ≥ x 0 (ε) for some x 0 (ε). In the case where K is normal and n ln |∆| → 0, λ K can be bounded absolutely, but there is no such result in the general case. During our relation search algorithm, we draw principal ideals at random. There is no known analogue of Sourfield's result for restricted classes of ideals. This is one of the reasons why the complexity of the number field sieve [LLMP90] is only heuristic. We therefore rely on the following heuristic for the smoothness of ideals.
Heuristic 1 We assume that the probability P (ι, µ) that a principal ideal of O K of norm bounded by ι is a power-product of prime ideals of norm bounded by µ satisfies
In this section, we show how to compute Cl(O K ) where K = Q(ζ p s ) is a cyclotomic field of prime power conductor in time L ∆ (1/2, c) for some constant c > 0 and ∆ = disc(K) under Heuristic 1. The best known heuristic complexity for fields of degree n ∈Θ(log(|∆|)) is in 2 O(n 2/3+ε ) where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant [BF14] . Cyclotomic fields of prime power conductor have a defining polynomial with height 1, which allows us to use a different technique than the one described in [BF14] . All we have to do is to draw elements α ∈ O K with small coefficients on the power basis 1, ζ p s , · · · , ζ n−1 p s and test them for smoothness with respect to a factor basis B = {p | N (p) ≤ B} for some smoothness bound B > 0. The smoothness test is simply done by checking if N (α) is Bsmooth as an integer using either a factoring algorithm [LLMP90, Pom85] or a dedicated smoothness test algorithm [Ber] . Every time we have a relation of the form
, we store the vector (e 1 , · · · , e m ) in the rows of a matrix M . Once enough relations are found, we complete the computation as in all previous subexponential methods [ Buc89, HM89b, BF14] by processing the matrix M .
The run time of Algorithm 3 depends on the probability of smoothness of principal ideals, which is ruled by Heuristic 1. This gives us a bound on the average time to find a relation. However, there is no indication that the relations we find are distributed according to a distribution in Λ allowing us to terminate the computation in subexponential time. Suppose we found a full rank sublattice Λ 0 of Λ, Hafner and McCurley [HM89a] proved under GRH that their relation 
.
. 13: Let V be the volume of the lattice generated by the rows of C, and h * be an approximation of hR given by the methods of [Bac95] . 14: if dV > 1.5h
* then k ← 2k and go to Step 3.
search for quadratic fields yielded relation vectors such that the probability of drawing one in the the coset w + Λ 0 for any w ∈ Λ was bounded from below by a large enough bound. This allowed them to justify that the algorithm would terminate with high enough probability in subexponential time. It it reasonable to assume that by drawing coefficient vectors uniformly at random in [−A, A], the generators of the principal ideals of our relations will be well enough distributed to justify that the relations themselves are equally distributed in Λ, but proving it remains an open question.
Heuristic 2 Let Λ 0 be a sublattice of Λ corresponding to the relations between primes in B, and A > 1 be a constant. If (a i ) i≤n is drawn uniformly at random in [−A, A] n , and if (α)O K = B wα is B-smooth, then for any w ∈ Λ
Proposition 1 (GRH+Heuristic 1+Heuristic 2). Algorithm 3 with B ∈ 2 O(n 1/2 ) and N of the form p s is correct and its heuristic complexity is in 2
Proof. The run time depends on the smoothness probability of α ∈ O K drawn in
Step 4. Let P ∈ Z[X] such that α = P (ζ N ) for N = p s . The norm of α is given by Res(Φ N , P ) where Φ N is the N -th cyclotomic polynomial. The first n rows of the resultant have length less than √ n while the last n rows have length bounded by √ nA. By Hadamard's bound, the resultant is bounded by n n A n . This means that log(|N (α)|) ≤ n log(n)(1 + o(1)) (as A is a constant). Let u := log(|N (α)|) log(B) , from Heuristic 1, the probability of finding a smooth α is at least e −u ln(u)(1+o(1)) ∈ 1 2 O ( n 1/2 ) , and therefore the whole relation search takes time 2 O(n 1/2 ) . The linear algebra phase (HNF and SNF computation) takes time
A q-descent algorithm to solve the PIP
In this section we show how decompose an input ideal I ⊆ O K into a B-smooth product for ideals in Cl(O K ) for some B > 0. In other words, we find
. Then I is principal if and only if i p ei i is principal as well, which is checked by solving a linear system as described in Algorithm 1. In the case where I is principal, this process also returns a generator.
To decompose I, we execute a q-descent consisting of searching for small elements α of I such that (α)/I is smooth with respect to ideals of norm less than I. Then we iterate the process on all divisors of (α)/I that have norm greater than B until we finally break it down into a product of ideals of norm less than B.
The idea of the q-descent derives from the algorithms based on the number field sieve [LLMP90] to solve the discrete logarithm problem in time L q (1/3) in F q (see in particular [AD93, Gor93, JLSV06] ). This idea was also used to solve the discrete logarithm problem in the Jacobian of certain classes of C ab curves [EGT] . A q-descent strategy was used to derive relations in Cl(O K ) in [Bia11,Biab,BF14], but it was restricted to classes of fields with degree n ∈ O(log(|∆|) a for some a < 1/2. In this paper, we achieve a heuristic L ∆ (1/2+ε, 1) complexity for any ε > 0 in cyclotomic fields despite the fact that the degree of these fields satisfies n ∈Θ(log(|∆|)).
Finding short elements in I We assume that I is an ideal of O K . We want to find elements α ∈ I of small norm. To do this, we restrict the search to the lattice Proof. The determinant of L I is that of the upper left k × k submatrix of H and satisfies det(L I ) ≤ i≤N v i,i = N (I). An HKZ-reduction returns a basis whose first vector has length less than
Lemma 2. In time 2 O(k) , we can find an element α ∈ I such that N (α) ≤ n n N (I) n k .
Proof. Let α be the first vector of an HKZ-reduced basis of L I . The calculation of this basis takes time 2 O(k) and by Lemma 1, the length of its first vector
By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, the algebraic norm of α :
A round of the q-descent Let ε > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant and q be a prime ideal with log(N (q)) ≤ n b for some 1/2 ≤ b ≤ 1. We would like to decompose the class of q in Cl(O K ) as a product of primes p with log(N (p)) ≤ n b−ε in time 2 O(n 1/2+ε ) .
Algorithm 4 One round of the q-descent
Input: Prime ideal q with log(N (q)) ≤ n b , a constant ε > 0 and A ≥ 1. Output: Prime ideals pi, integers ei and α ∈ q such that (α)/q = i p e i i and log(N (pi)) ≤ n b−ε . 1: S ← pi such that N (pi) ≤ 12 log(|∆|) 2 . 2: while no relation has been found do 3:
i where R is the uniform distribution.
4:
Construct a basis for the lattice LI with k = n 1/2+ε . 5:
HKZ-reduce LI and let α be its first vector. 6:
if (α) is 2 n b−ε -smooth, find (pi),(ei) such that (α) = i p e i i . 7: end while 8: return α, (ei), (pi), (ei).
Proposition 2 (GRH + Heuristic 1). Let ε > 0 be a constant, 1/2 ≤ b ≤ 1, and q be a prime ideal with log(N (q)) ≤ n b . There is a large enough constant A such that Algorithm 4 returns a decomposition of q in Cl(O K ) as a product of degree one primes p i with log(N (p)) ≤ n b−ε in time 2 O(n 1/2+ε ) when the conductor N is of the form p s .
Proof. The ideal I created in Step 3 of Algorithm 4 satisfies N (I) = N (q) 1+o(1) . Therefore, according to Lemma 2, the α derived in Step 5 satisfies log(N (α)) ≤ n k log (N (q)) (1 + o(1)). As log (N (q)) ≤ n b and k = n 1/2+ε , this gives us log(N (α)) ≤ n 1/2+b−ε (1 + o(1)). We want (α)/I to be B-smooth for log(B) = n b−ε . Let u = log(N (α)) log(B) , the probability of finding such an α is
For any constant A ≥ 2, the size A |S| ≥ 2 n 2 of the search space is sufficient to find our α. The run time of this procedure is dominated by the reduction of L q which takes 2
Full procedure Assume we are given an arbitrary ideal I ⊆ O K as input. Before initiating the q-descent, we need to break it down into a product of primes q i with log(q i ) ≤ n. To do this, we multiply a by an random power product of ideals of the factor base B, and BKZ-reduce it. This is done by finding a short element φ ∈ c where a −1 = 1 d c with d ∈ Z >0 and c ⊆ O. When using the BKZ algorithm with block size l = n 1/2 , such a short element satisfies
|∆| and it is 2 nsmooth with probability
by following the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2. Repeating the process 2 n 1/2+o(1) times yields the original 2 n -smooth decomposition.
Algorithm 5 Initial decomposition
Input: An ideal I ⊆ OK , factor base B, and a constant A ≥ 1. Output: α ∈ K such that b := (α)I is 2 n -smooth. 1: a ← i p e i i for random ei ≤ A (use a square-and-multiply strategy). 2: c ← la −1 where l is the denominator of a. 3: Find a BKZ reduced φ ∈ c with block size l = n 1/2 . 4: α ← φ l . 5: if b := (α)I is not 2 n -smooth for degree 1 primes then go to Step 1. 6: return α.
Algorithm 6 q-descent
Input: I ⊆ OK and an arbitrarily small ε > 0. Output: Prime ideals (qi) i≤l ∈ B with N (qi) ≤ 2 n 1/2 , integers (ei) and (φj) j≤k ∈ K such that I = j≤k (φj) · i≤l q e i i 1: Decompose I = (φ1) i qi using Algorithm 5. 2: genList ← {φ1}, primeList ← {q1, . . . , q l }, expList ← {1, · · · , 1}. 3: b ← 1. 4: while b > 1/2 do 5:
for q ∈ primeList with log(N (q)) > n b−ε do 6:
i by a round of the q-descent.
7:
genList ← genList ∪ {φ k }, primeList ← primeList ∪ {q1, . . . , q l }.
8:
expList ← {e1, · · · , e l }.
9:
Remove q from primeList and expList. 10:
end for 11:
b ← b − ε. 12: end while 13: return genList, primeList, expList. 
Proof. The cost of the initial decomposition is in 2
O(l) where l = n 1/2 is the block size of the BKZ reduction. The depth of the decomposition tree arising from the q-descent is 1 2ε which is a constant. The arity of this tree is at most n 2 , so Algorithm 4 is called at most polynomially many times.
Practical improvements to the computation of Cl(O K )
and the resolution of the PIP
The subexponential methods we presented in Section 5 and Section 6 have a heuristic asymptotic run time in 2 O(n 1/2+ε ) , and depending on the choices made for implementation, the practical performances of these algorithms can vary significantly. In this section, we present some practical improvements which do not affect the asymptotic complexity, but which impact the practical run time. As the computation of the ideal class group and the resolution of the Principal Ideal Problem are widely studied problems, there are many existing improvements that readily apply to our algorithm, and many of them are folklore. For example, for each relation i p i = (α) we find, we immediately get an additional | Gal(K/Q)| − 1 others by including i p σ i = (σ(α)) for all σ ∈ Gal(K/Q). This method is present in the class group algorithm available in both PARI [PAR14] and Magma [BCP97] . The large prime variants are another folklore practical improvement. It was originally described in the context of integer factorization [LM91,DLL
+ 02], and was successfully adapted to the resolution of the DLP in finite fields, and in the Jacobian of curves. The single large prime variant for computing Cl(O K ) was first presented by Jacobson [Jac99] while the double large prime variant was first successfully used for computing class groups by Biasse [Biaa] . Other improvements impacting the practical performances of our methods include quadratic [Jac00] and lattice [BF12] sieving, as well as optimized methods of computing the HNF and the SNF of a large integer matrix. In this section, we restrict ourselves to improvements that are very specific to the settings of the algorithm. More specifically, we develop two points:
-We show how to efficiently reduce the resolution of the PIP in Cl (O Q(ζN ) )
to an instance of the PIP in Cl(O Q(ζN ) + ). -We show how to enhance the relation search by looking for elements of small norm near the cyclotomic units.
Solving the PIP in the maximal real subfield Using subfields (and in particular the maximal real subfield K + ) is folklore. Several references use a variant around this idea. We specifically rely on the Gentry-Szydlo method [GS02] and its extension by Howgrave-Graham and Szydlo [HS04] for solving norm equations of the form N Q(ζN )/Q(ζN ) + (x) = g. Halving the degree of the field can have a significant impact on the practical behavior of the PIP algorithm. The input size which is given by log(|∆|) is halved in the case of a power of two cyclotomic. In addition, the LLL algorithm has a practical behavior significantly better than the worst case estimates for lower dimensions. Indeed, it is expected to return a basis
d (see [NS06] ). This makes a difference in practice during a relation search based on the search for small elements in LLL-reduced bases of ideals 1 . Given an input ideal I ⊆ O K , we want to find a generator of the ideal I ′ generated by N K/K + (I) in O K + . The ideal I ′ is principal. However, the norm map is not surjective. This means that there can be a generator of I ′ that is not the norm of a generator of I. If we solve the PIP for I ′ in O K + and find g ∈ O K + such that I ′ = (g), then we need to find another generator g ′ that is the norm of an element in K. To proceed, we find the right unit u ∈ O * K + such that g ′ = ug is totally positive. Given a set of fundamental units (u 1 , · · · , u r ) for O * K + , this can be done by solving a linear system in F 2 . For α ∈ K + , let δ(α) ∈ F r 2 be the signature of x, i.e. δ(α) i = 0 if σ i (α) ≥ 0, and δ(α) i = 1 otherwise. Let M = (δ(u i ) j ) i,j≤r , then the right product of the u i turning g into a totally positive number is
Proposition 4. When K is of the form K = Q(ζ 2 s ), there is always a solution to the system (x 1 , · · · , x r )M = δ(g).
Proof. According to [Gar76, Prop. 1], there are units of arbitrary signature in Q(ζ 2 s ). Therefore, there must be a linear combination of the signatures of the units in the generating set that matches δ(g).
Proposition 5. When K = Q(ζ 2 s ), a totally positive generator g ′ of I ′ is necessarily the norm of a generator of I.
Proof. I
′ is generated by at least one totally positive number (i.e. the image 
which is the image of a generator of I.
Before applying the Howgrave-Graham and Szydlo [HS04] norm equation resolution method, we need to make sure that the input is polynomially bounded, which is not guaranteed if we take an arbitrary solution to the PIP in O K + (even after adjusting the signature). However, we know the existence of a short (totally positive) generator of I ′ , namely the norm of a short generator of I. We are facing an instance of the Bounded Distance Decoding problem similar to the one solved by Cramer et al. [CDPR16] . The logarithms of the norms of the cyclotomic units enjoy similar geometric properties as the logarithms of the cyclotomic units themselves. Therefore, applying the method of [CDPR16] on g ′ yields a small generator g ′′ of I ′ on which we can apply the algorithm for the resolution of the norm equation 
Search for relations around the cyclotomic units Our relation search method to compute Cl(O K ) consists of drawing polynomials f (ζ N ) with small coefficients at random and to check the norm of the resulting algebraic integer for smoothness. As we saw, the algebraic norm is bounded from above by a function of the length of the vector of coefficients of f (X). Therefore, it is natural to search elements represented by a very small coefficient vector.
We observe that N (f (ζ N )) is a polynomial in the coefficients of f , and is therefore a continuous function. In cyclotomic fields, we know a set of minimums for this function before hand: the cyclotomic units u a = ζ a N −1 ζN −1 . For each a, N (u a ) = 1, and we expect small variations around the u a to yield algebraic numbers of small norm, although the coefficient vector of the corresponding polynomials might be long. In Table 1 , we compared the strategy consisting of drawing algebraic integers that are small variations around the cyclotomic units to the sampling of random coefficient vectors. We drew coefficient vectors of the same Hamming weight w = 10, 20, 30, 50, 75, 100 in K = Q(ζ 2 512 ). For each w, we drew 100 random coefficient vectors of coefficients in {0, 1} (denoted by "Random vectors"), and we drew 100 elements that differed from a cyclotomic unit u of weight w by a term in ζ i N for some i. In Table 1 , we observe that the size of the elements α increases as the Hamming weight of their coefficient vector over the power basis gets larger. Meanwhile, at a comparable Hamming weight, the size of a small variation around a cyclotomic unit does not seem to be affected. In fact, it is the distance to the unit that seems to rule the size of α. For example, we measured small variations around u 101 (of Hamming weight 101).
If we draw α ′ and α at random such that log(|N (α
T where T is the expected time to find a smooth α. Our numerical results indicate that the unit variation method should provide a significant speed-up over the random vectors method even when we allow a Hamming distance larger than one.
8 PIP and γ-SVP in Q(ζ p s ) with precomputation
In Section 6, we showed how to compute the PIP in heuristic subexponential time 2 O(n 1/2+ε ) . This provides an attack against schemes relying on the hardness of finding a short generator of a principal ideal such as [SV10, GGH13] . Also, according to [CDPR16] , the size of a short generator of I resulting from the BDD algorithm on the log-unit lattice is within e O( √ n) of the first minima of the ideal lattice I. Moreover, it was recently conjectured [CDW16] that for most fields Q(ζ), any ideal of O Q(ζ) was within a short enough ideal multiple from a principal ideal. Therefore, solutions to the PIP in O Q(ζ) yields solution to γ-SVP in ideals of O Q(ζ) for γ ∈ e O( √ n) . Since the methods of Section 6 run in heuristic subexponential time 2 O(n 1/2+ε ) , this does not offer a better trade-off than using a BKZ reduction with block size in O( √ n).
In this section, we show how to leverage a subexponential precomputation to solve all instances of γ-SVP in ideals of O Q(ζN ) for N = p s and γ ∈ e
, thus achieving a better trade-off than the BKZ reduction. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a method for solving γ-SVP beats the BKZ time/approximation trade-off even with a precomputation on the field. The general idea is to use the ideal class group computation given by Algorithm 3 with a larger factor base bound B. This gives us a basis for all relations between the prime ideals of norm less than B. Then given an input ideal I, we first compute α and q 1 , · · · , q k such that I = (α) i q i with N (q i ) ≤ B, and then we solve the PIP problem for i q i . The larger the smoothness bound B is, the more expensive the precomputation gets. Meanwhile all subsequent PIP resolutions using this precomputation get faster since their run time is dominated by the decomposition in Cl(O K ) of I as a product of ideals of norm bounded by B. 
Our precomputation step additionally processes this basis and the (α i ) to return an HNF-reduced basis (h 1 , · · · , h m ) for L. Using [Sto00, Prop. 6.3], we can find a unimodular U ∈ Gl k×k (Z) such that
m , Mult(x) the complexity of x-bit integer multiplication, and 2 ≤ θ ≤ 3 the matrix multiplication exponent. The matrix H = U B has a small essential part. Under GRH, h i,i = 1 for i > 12 log(|∆|) 2 . We leverage this to facilitate the resolution of the linear system giving the solution to the PIP. However, for this to yield a generator (as opposed to just the answer whether or not I is principal), we need to compute the (β i ) i≤m such that j≤k α Ui,j j = β i for i ≤ m. As the coefficients of U and the number of terms m in the product are large, we cannot afford to write down these algebraic numbers on the power basis. However, we know that they are used to compute an element of I whose length is within eÕ ( √ n) of the first minima λ 1 (I) ≤ √ n|∆| 1/n N (I) 1/n of the ideal lattice I. So we compute β i mod p j for a collection of split prime ideals Proof. The run time of Algorithm 8 is clearly dominated by the cost of the search for relations and the computation of the HNF of the relation matrix (together with the premultipliers). We need to bound the Log(β i ). The upper bound on a generator β i of the principal ideal I i = j≤m p hi,j j is essentially given by the norm of the integral ideal I i . When i ≤ i 0 , I i has the shape I i = j≤i0 p hi 0 ,j j while when i > i 0 , I i is of the form
, and
Algorithm 8 Precomputation step
Input: Split primes (pi) i≤l , B > 0, and conductor N . Output: H in HNF form with (βj mod pi) such that B H i = (βi)OK for B = {p | N (p) ≤ B}, and (Log(βj )) j≤m . 1: Compute a generating set b1, · · · , b k of the lattice L of vectors x such that B x ∼ (1) and (αi) i≤k such that B b i = (αi) using Algorithm 3. 2: Find U ∈ Gl k×k (Z) such that U · B = H in HNF form for B = (bi) i≤k using [Sto00, Prop. 6.3]. 3:
Let (xj) j≤r be the output of Algorithm 2 solving the BDD on input Ii, (uj ) j≤r . 8:
Log(βj ) ← x1 Log(u1) + · · · + xr Log(ur) + Log(βj ) for j ≤ m. 10: end for 11: return H, (βi mod pj ) i≤m,j≤l , (Log(βj )) j≤m
(|∆|) , and min σ |σ(
, and the representation of the vector Log(β i ) has a polynomial bit size in n.
Decomposing I The second step of our search for a generator of I satisfying N (I) ≤ 2 n b is to break it down as a product of ideals of norm less than B ∈ 2 O(n 2−3a+ε ) for an arbitrarily small ε > 0 in time 2 O(n a+o(1) ) where
We proceed by a q-descent procedure similar to that of Section 6. Given a prime ideal q such that log(N (q)) ≤ n b , we look for α ∈ q such that (α)/q = q i where the q i are prime ideals satisfying log(N (q i )) ≤ n b−ε . We look for small vectors of L I with the same definition of L I as in Section 6 by using the BKZ reduction method with block size l := n a and by parameterizing L q with the degree k := n min{4a−1,b+2a−1−ε} .
Lemma 3. Let l ≤ k ≤ n. By using a BKZ reduction on L I , we can find a vector in L I of length less than l k/2l N (I)
Proof. The determinant of L I is that of the upper left k × k submatrix of H and satisfies det(L I ) ≤ i≤N v i,i = N (I). An BKZ-reduction with block length l returns a basis whose first vector has length less than
Lemma 4. In time 2 O(l) , we can find an element α ∈ I such that N (α) ≤ l 
Algorithm 9 One round of the q-descent
Input: Prime ideal q with log(N (q)) ≤ n b , ε > 0, a > 0, and a conductor N . Output: Prime ideals pi, integers ei and α ∈ q such that (α)/q = i p
2 . 2: while no relation has been found do 3:
4:
Construct a basis for the lattice LI with k := n min{4a−1,b+2a−1−ε} . 5:
BKZ-reduce LI with block size l := n a and let α be its first vector. 6:
if ( Let q be a prime with log(N (q)) ≤ n b . When N = q s , there is a large enough constant A such that Algorithm 9 returns a decomposition of q in Cl(O K ) as a product of primes p i with log(N (p)) ≤ n b−ε in time 2Õ
(n a+o(1) ) .
Proof. According to Lemma 2, any α derived in Step 4 of Algorithm 9 satisfies log(N (α)) ∈ O nk log(l) l
(1 + o(1)) + n k log(q) . As k ≤ n 4a−1 and l = n a , we get nk l ≤ n 1+4c−1−c n 3a .
Likewise since k = min{n 4a−1 , n b+2a−1−ε }, we get n k log(q) ≤ n 1+b−4a+1 ≤ n 3a n k log(q) ≤ n 1+b−(b+2a−1−ε) ≤ n 2(1−a)+ε ≤ n 3a
The latter inequality follows from the fact that by definition a ≥ 2 5 + ε 5 . In each case, log(N (α)) ∈ O(n 3a (1 + o(1))), and testing the smoothness of N (α) with the Number Field Sieve takes time 2 O(n a+o(1) ) . As k ≤ n b+2a−1−ε , we also have nk l ≤ n 1+b+2a−1−ε−a = n a+b−ε .
In addition, we can show that k ≥ n 1−a+ε . Indeed, from the definition of a, b we get
Therefore, we have the following inequality n k log(q) ≤ n 1+b−(1−a+ε) = n a+b−ε .
This means that log(N (α)) ∈ O(n a+b−ε (1 + o(1))), and from Heuristic 1, the number of α we need to test before obtaining one such that (α)/I is 2 n b−ε -smooth is bounded by 2 O(n a+o(1) ) . For correctness, we need to check that we always have l ≤ k ≤ n. First, k ≥ n 1−a+ε , and
Since a < 1 2 , we must have k ≥ n a = l. On the other hand, we have k = min{n 4a−1 , n b+2a−1−ε }, and 4a − 1 ≤ 1 ⇔ a ≤ 1 2 , which is satisfied by definition of a. Therefore, we always have k ≤ n.
Algorithm 10 q-descent for q ∈ primeList with N (q) > n b−ε/2 do 5:
Find (qi) i≤l , (ei) i≤l and φ k such that q = (φ k ) i≤l q e i i by Algorithm 9. 6: genList ← genList ∪ {φ k }, primeList ← primeList ∪ {q1, . . . , q l }.
7:
expList ← expList ∪ {e1, · · · , e l }.
8:
Remove q from primeList, expList.
9:
end for 10:
b ← b − ε. 11: end while 12: return genList, primeList, expList.
Proposition 10 (GRH + Heuristic 1 + Heuristic 3). When using a precomputation corresponding to Algorithm 3 with smoothness bound B ∈ 2 O(2−3a+2ε) for a, b, ε > 0 such that 1. 2 − 3a + 2ε ≤ b ≤ 7a − 2, 2. -An entity precomputes the data and the attacker downloads it. In this case the storage required is proportional to the expected time of the attack, that is 2 O(n a ) . -The attacker is allowed to query the entity having done the precomputation.
In this case, the entity sends the attacker the significantly smaller matrix corresponding to the relations between the short ideals before hand, and for each challenge, the attacker asks for the decomposition of the large primes in the decomposition of the ideal given as input to the q-descent.
Remark The precomputation can go on after the computation of the HNF of the large relation matrix. The entity performing the precomputation can continue creating new relations by performing q-descents on the large primes which are not already in the factor basis B. The HNF of the relation matrix can be updated at a minimal cost.
